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EMERGENCE IN DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS
Abstract
Emergence is a term used in many contexts in current science; it has become 
fashionable. It has a traditional usage in philosophy that started in 1875 and 
was expanded by J. S. Mill (earlier, under a different term) and C. D. Broad. 
It is this form of emergence that I am concerned with here. I distinguish it from 
uses like ‘computational emergence,’ which can be reduced to combinations of 
program steps, or its application to merely surprising new features that appear in 
complex combinations of parts. I will be concerned specifically with ontological 
emergence that has the logical properties required by Mill and Broad (though 
there might be some quibbling about the details of their views). I restrict myself 
to dynamical systems that are embodied in processes. Everything that we can 
interact with through sensation or action is either dynamical or can be understood 
in dynamical terms, so this covers all comprehensible forms of emergence in the 
strong (nonreducible) sense I use. I will give general dynamical conditions that 
underlie the logical conditions traditionally assigned to emergence in nature. 
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The advantage of this is that, though we cannot test logical conditions directly, 
we can test dynamical conditions. This gives us an empirical and realistic form 
of emergence, contrary those who say it is a matter of perspective.
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Introduction
“Emergence” has become somewhat of a buzzword in the past few 
decades. Inevitably it has been used in ways that do not reflect its intellectual 
roots. Before I go on to explain the traditional philosophical notion of 
emergence, I want to make clear what that notion is not. It is necessary to do 
this because some authors have rejected the very idea of emergence based 
on misuses of the word that often draw for their apparent significance on 
the philosophical notion. For example, we might talk of something new and 
unexpected as emergent, such as “the emergence of the Internet” or of “the 
emergence of a new scientific discipline”, or even of a new political party. 
Characteristic of this sort of case is that something unexpected but integrated 
evolves that is importantly different from what has come before. What is 
not implied is that this novelty could not have been in principle predicted, 
nor that it cannot be fully understood by understanding what it emerged 
from together with the processes by which it emerged. Sometimes this sort 
of emergence is called “weak emergence” (Bedau 1997; Collier and Muller 
1998; Chalmers 2006), though characterizations of emergence, and weak 
emergence in particular, are usually done in terms of a relation between levels 
at the same time (synchronic), whereas the sort of usage I gave examples 
of above is typically the result of a process and across time (diachronic). 
Although I don’t think this difference is metaphysically significant for the 
traditional idea of emergence, it can matter in practice. In particular, it creates 
potential problems for determining when exactly emergence arises. Later 
I will argue that fully understanding and detecting strong emergence, 
which unlike weak emergence is not reducible in principle,1 is enhanced by 
a process-oriented, diachronic view. One consequence is that emergence is 
1 Chalmers (2006) defines weak emergence so that strong emergence may be a variety 
of weak emergence. I think this is confusing, and prefer to define them so that they are 
mutually exclusive. See (Collier and Muller 1998 and Bedau 1997) for more details.19 Emergence in Dynamical Systems
seen as a process, and emerging can reasonably be seen as something that 
happens by degrees at a fine scale, though at a larger scale it appears sudden. 
One example of a group that focuses on weak emergence (though 
they often give the impression of dealing with something more) is the New 
England Complex Systems Institute (Bar-Yam 2011). They say such things 
as:
In describing collective behaviors, emergence refers to how collective 
properties arise from the properties of parts, how behavior at 
a larger scale arises from the detailed structure, behavior and relationships 
at a finer scale. For example, cells that make up a muscle display the 
emergent property of working together to produce the muscle’s overall 
structure and movement. A water molecule has emergent properties that 
arise out of the properties of oxygen and hydrogen atoms. Many water 
molecules together form river flows and ocean waves. Trees, other plants 
and animals form a forest.
When we think about emergence we are, in our mind’s eye, moving 
among views at different scales. We see the trees and the forest at the 
same time, in order to see how the trees and the forest are related to each 
other. We might consider particularly those details of the trees that are 
important in giving rise to the behavior of the forest.
In conventional views the observer considers either the trees or the forest. 
Those who consider the trees consider the details to be essential and do 
not see the patterns that arise when considering trees in the context of 
the forest. Those who consider the forest do not see the details. When 
one can shift back and forth between seeing the trees and the forest 
one also sees which aspects of the trees are relevant to the description 
of the forest. Understanding this relationship in general is the study of 
emergence.
They also refer to function as relevant to emergence, but as in 
interaction of something with its environment:
Consider a key. A description of a key’s structure is not enough to show 
us that it can open a door. To know whether the key can open a door, 
we need descriptions of both the structure of the key and the structure 
of the lock. However, we can tell someone that the function of the key 
is to unlock the door without providing a detailed description of either.
Their restriction to weak emergence comes out clearly in their non-
standard use of “reductionist”:20 John Collier
The perspective that considers emergence is often contrasted with 
a reductionist perspective, which thinks about parts in isolation. 
Reductionism is the often vilified “anti-complex systems” view of the 
world. The concept of a system is itself based upon a limited form of 
reductionism that distinguishes the system from its environment, and 
the parts of a system from each other. The key difference is that the 
non-reductionist approach considers the relationships among them.
I belabour this because NECSI claims to deal with complex systems in 
general, which might lead one to deal with strongly emergent systems, but 
their focus and definitions make this dubious at best. Their notion of reduction 
is not the one used in traditional philosophical approaches to emergence, as 
I will explain in the next section. Furthermore, there is more than a hint of 
the idea that emergence depends on the viewpoint or stance of an observer.2
Bedau (1997) claims that weak emergence was developed in the 
context of complexity theory (also Chalmers 2006). I think this is right, 
with an important caveat. Something was needed to explain the breakdown 
and reappearance of order in chaotic processes like the “period doubling 
route to chaos.”3 These are often surprising, but need not be unpredictable 
in principle, although they can be computationally intractable to model due 
to combinatoric explosions requiring more computational capacity than we 
can provide. Bedau also points out that what is sometimes called “emergent 
computation” (e.g., Forrest 1991) at best models strong emergence, and is 
weakly emergent (examples are the “gliders” in cellular automata). Similar 
confusion exists over notions like complexity itself and self-organization. 
It turns out that there are two notions of complexity in the complexity 
literature, and also two distinct notions of self-organization. Some authors, 
like Robert Rosen (1991), connect emergence with notions of computability; 
indeed, I do myself (Collier 2008a). It turns out, furthermore, there are two 
notions of computability that must be distinguished (Collier 2012a). I will 
return to these points at the end of this section.
2 Ernst Nagel (1961, p. 367) argues that emergence is relative to a theory, based on his 
positivist principles. Basically, this makes emergence a language-dependent property. 
The observer-dependence of emergence (and complexity) is also advanced by Allen and 
Hoekstra (1991), among others, though their text seems to me to often presuppose the 
opposite.
3 Contrary to some opinion, the state of onset of “chaos” via the period doubling route 
is completely analysable by classical mathematical techniques (Smith 1999).21 Emergence in Dynamical Systems
Some emergentists invoke notions of separate substances, causal 
independence and teleology that border on obscurantism. They believe that 
emergent properties must “arise from”, but not be causally dependent on, 
underlying or prior properties. Whether or not this position is coherent, it 
is certainly mysterious, and evidence in its favour is lacking. Nagel (1961, 
p. 377) points out that although emergence is sometimes associated with 
radical indeterminism and/or teleological causation, this association is not 
essential. Let us assume that his usage, which follows C. D. Broad (1925), 
is authoritative. I will therefore assume that emergent entities and properties 
supervene on the level that they emerge from; that is, given the lower-level 
properties in total, at most one set of supervenient properties is possible. 
Kim (1978) bases the principle of supervenience on a general metaphysical 
position that the world is determined by its physical structure, whereas 
Kincaid (1987) suggests that the principle is empirically based, given that 
we have no testable reasons to believe that there is anything nonphysical. 
I believe that the metaphysical and empirical reasons are each sufficient 
independently, but combined they are stronger than either alone. Each 
answers certain doubts otherwise left open by the other. If emergence, weak 
or strong, entails radical indeterminism, the principle of supervenience rules 
it out. Whereas weak emergence is too weak, the separate substance view 
is too strong.
For now it is important that, while weak emergence is interesting, 
it is not nearly as interesting as strong emergence, nor as controversial.4 
Furthermore, it is strong emergence that corresponds to the traditional 
philosophical notion of Mill and Broad.5 A final point is that though there 
is nothing especially dynamically unusual about weak emergence, strong 
emergence is very special dynamically and violates longstanding assumptions 
about dynamical systems that have held up until very recently and are still 
assumed in much of science, let alone amongst philosophers, though the 
assumptions were questioned as early as 18th Century criticisms of Laplace’s 
work (Collier 2012b). I will make the violation of these assumptions clear 
4 Chalmers (2006) thinks that only consciousness is strongly emergent; I will argue 
that this is false. Chalmers seems to me to flirt with the two-substance view, or at least 
two realms of some sort. There are also emergent views about naturalized religion that 
seem to me to flirt with the two-substance view. Examples are Stuart Kauffman (1995) 
and a number of the articles in Davies and Gregersen (2010).
5 Chalmers agrees with this.22 John Collier
below. Clarifying this will require making the distinctions between weak and 
strong emergence, two notions of complexity and two notions of computation 
as clear as possible.
The philosophical notion of emergence
The term ‘emergent’ was introduced in its modern philosophical version 
by G. H. Lewes in 1875 (Blitz 1992), though the idea arguably appeared as 
early as Aristotle. Lewes said that the emergent is incommensurable with 
its components and cannot be reduced to their sum or their difference. This 
notion is basically the same as Bill Wimsatt’s notion of non-aggregativity 
(Wimsatt 1995; 2007, pp. 174–177). A system is aggregative just in 
case its properties are determined fully by some sum of the properties 
of its parts. J. S. Mill had earlier developed a very similar notion in his 
System of Logic (1843, Book III, Ch. 6), according to which a living body 
cannot be understood as a mere summing up of the separate actions of its 
components. He accepted that basic physical laws were not violated, but what 
we would now call strongly-emergent laws could impose further restrictions. 
The next major step was taken by C. D. Broad (1925), who expanded 
in some detail on the idea of in-principle irreducibility, in the sense of non-
derivability of emergent dynamics from any composition of the lower level 
dynamics (compare with the weak version of non-reduction proposed by the 
NECSI group). Broad’s notion of emergence makes any emergent property 
unpredictable from its basis dynamics (Broad 1925, p. 61). Broad, like his 
predecessors, also held that emergent properties are novel: they are not 
properties of their underlying basis, except when fused (Humphreys 1997; 
Wong 2006) to produce the emergent properties.6
Strong emergence constitutes a cluster of properties that are tied together 
by a logical notion of non-derivability and its counterpart, non-reducibility. 
Corning (2002) lists the properties, following Goldstein (1999) as follows:   
6 See Collier (2008a) for an explanation of how fusion defeats Kim’s (2005) mistaken 
view that if supervenience holds, the supervenient system has no casual power. 
Humphreys views fusion as replacing the underlying properties, whereas my cohesion 
(Collier and Muller 1998; Collier 2003) retains the lower level properties but restricts 
their range. The difference is not large. Both, I think, explain Campbell’s (1974) rather 
mysterious “downward causation” (shudder quotes in the original title).23 Emergence in Dynamical Systems
(1) radical novelty (features not previously observed in systems); 
(2) coherence or correlation (integrated wholes that maintain themselves 
over some period of time); (3) A global or macro “level” (i.e., there is 
some property of “wholeness”); (4) it is the product of a dynamical 
process (it evolves); and (5) it is “ostensive” (it can be perceived). 
For good measure, Goldstein throws in supervenience—downward 
causation. 
Strangely, they leave out the non-reducibility/non-derivability/non-
aggregativity requirement, which leaves open the possibility of weak 
emergence. From talks and my reading of both Corning’s and Goldstein’s 
other works, I am pretty sure that they intended to capture something both 
stronger and objective. The non-reducibility requirement is crucial to the 
traditional view, and from it Goldstein’s’ other properties can be derived 
without ambiguity (see Collier and Muller 1998; Collier 2008a). They 
also don’t include the traditional property of emergent systems being non-
predictable. As we shall see, this is tied up with non-reducibility. Instead, 
they have the slippery condition of “radical novelty” and tie it to observation, 
suggesting that they have not moved beyond weak emergence. Broad’s 
conditions are four: Unpredictability—The higher level cannot be predicted 
in principle; Non-reducibility—The whole is logically more than the sum of 
its parts; Holistic—The system cannot be decomposed into its parts without 
loss; and Novelty—The tricky one because there is no clear definition, but 
not merely surprise, implying a new kind of property. I will argue below 
that the first three of Broad’s conditions have the same dynamical source, 
and then I will argue that this implies a specific sort of novelty.
The problem with accounts of strong emergence in terms of non-
reducibility, non-predictability, holism and novelty is that these are logical 
conditions that cannot be observed directly, because they cannot be interacted 
with directly. For this reason, I advocate a dynamical account of emergence 
from which the logical conditions for emergence can be derived. The 
dynamical conditions can be tested for directly, confirming the system has 
the required properties for emergence. I will give these conditions after 
a couple of brief excursions through related ideas.24 John Collier
A Note on Systems
A system in the sense of Systems Theory is a coordinated set of elements 
or components that combine through their relationships to form a unity. 
Systems are distinguished from each other either by their parts or their 
components (including qualities and especially relations), or both. For any 
dynamically embodied system, the relations are causal interactions (or at 
least grounded in causal interactions). The causal interactions can go in both 
directions between elements, allowing for positive and negative feedback, 
and non-linearity in general. These relations are constituted of forces and 
flows among nodes, making them dynamical in a physical sense. Dynamical 
relations among combinations of three or more components that cannot be 
reduced to pairwise dynamical relations are not excluded. If the relations are 
stable, then their totality can be called the structure of the system. We can also 
speak of the boundary conditions of a system, which are a set of constraints 
on its behaviour, and the laws of a system, which refer to regularities in its 
behaviour and possible behaviours (usually allowing for a wide range of 
possible boundary conditions). Note that system laws can be peculiar to 
a particular system and are not the same as natural laws, though they may 
be instantiations of natural laws. If the nodes change (are added, subtracted 
or merge), the system is much more complex and the system structure is 
  Equation: Algebraic Ordinary 
Differential
Partial 
Differential
  One Parameter Trivial Easy Difficult
Linear 
Equations
Several 
Parameters Easy Difficult Intractable
  Many 
Parameters Intractable Intractable Impossible
  One Parameter Very Difficult Very Difficult Impossible
Nonlinear 
Equations
Several 
Parameters Very Difficult Impossible Impossible
  Many 
Parameters Impossible Impossible Impossible25 Emergence in Dynamical Systems
itself dynamical. Without going into details, we can say that the constraints 
on the system are not static and the constraints and system laws cannot be 
separated. I will go into more detail below, as this is a necessary condition 
for dynamical emergence.
‘Dynamical system’ is a mathematical concept that describes how 
a system evolves from one state to another. Technically, it is smooth mapping 
of either the reals or integers of a manifold (state space) onto itself. The 
mathematical concept is the accepted way of describing systems, at least 
as an ideal to be approximated, and as a regulating principle in any case 
for descriptions of natural systems. This ideal can be easy to satisfy in 
some cases, difficult in others, and cannot be obtained in practice for many 
systems. For other mathematical kinds of systems, no general solutions 
are possible. The full set of possibilities is given in the table above (after 
Bertalanffy 1968, p. 20). The impossible cases have no analytical solution 
in principle. This is where we should look for strong emergence.
Computability and Predictability
A system can be predicted across time if and only if its trajectory can be 
calculated from its initial and boundary conditions specified within some 
region of its phase (state) space, together with its equations of motion, 
to be within some region of phase space at some arbitrary later time. 
Specifically, the trajectory of a system is predictable if and only if there is 
a region η constraining the initial conditions at t0 such that the equations of 
motion ensure that the trajectory of the system passes within some region 
ε at some time t1, where the region η is chosen to satisfy ε. Indeterministic 
systems have probabilistic predictability. Predictability applies in principle 
to all closed Hamiltonian systems (specifically, conservative of energy and 
holonomic; i.e., roughly, that the parameters of the system are a function 
of its energy and positions only), including those without exact analytical 
solutions, such as the three-body case.7 The systems without exact analytical 
solutions can be numerically calculated in principle for any finite time, if we 
7  Laplace was able to show that the orbits of the major bodies of the Solar System 
were stable for at least 100 million years, no mean accomplishment for a many-bodied 
system (Collier 2012b; also Gillespie 1997).26 John Collier
have a large enough computer. We might call this stepwise computability. 
All computations are stepwise computable, but some computations do not 
terminate. These computations, however, are stepwise computable and 
allow, in principle—the required computer might have to be larger than the 
known universe—the arbitrarily exact computation of a finite later state. 
The macrostate of a microsystem can be predicted similarly by composing 
the trajectories of the microcomponents and averaging to get the expected 
macrovalues. This makes higher levels synchronically predictable. Stochastic 
(chance) systems are predictable within the bounds of their probabilities 
in general, and introduce no special problems: higher levels can again be 
predicted statistically as long as all of the low level laws are holonomic.
To undermine predictability, at least one of the assumptions must go. 
The assumptions are: 1) the system is closed, 2) the system is a traditional 
Hamiltonian system with holonomic or at least near-holonomic laws, and 
3) there exist sufficient computational resources. The third condition is 
a shorthand way of saying that the information in all properties of the system 
can be computed from some set of boundary conditions and physical laws, 
where information is understood as an objective measure of asymmetry as in 
(Muller 2007, and less rigorously in Collier 1996). I will demonstrate later 
that all three of these assumptions are violated for some simple physical 
systems, including some in the solar system.8 There are some systems that 
violate (3) because no computer could, even in principle, have sufficient 
power, let alone one connected to the system under study, yet the systems 
evolve to more ordered states. I will give an example below in terms of 
Newtonian body mechanics with gravity and friction that serves as an 
exemplar of this sort of case. More complex cases may be more nuanced, 
but there are systems that go beyond just unpredictability and the formation 
of ordered properties.
Novelty does not necessarily follow from mathematical unpredictability, 
since there may be no new properties formed in unpredictable systems, but 
novelty is impossible with unpredictability, except in the trivial sense that 
a pile of blocks is novel with respect to the block components scattered 
8 I have argued that causation can be understood as computation (Collier 1999; 2012a). 
I resolve the problem of non-computable processes by making the distinction between 
Turing computability and stepwise computability. Only the former allows information 
entailments to be calculated. It is quite possible for information in one state to entail the 
information in another without the relation being Turing computable.27 Emergence in Dynamical Systems
about in a child’s toy box. The predictability of the macrostate of a system 
from its microstate (states of the components of its substrate) is just the 
condition of reducibility, so unpredictability is also required for and 
sufficient for irreducibility. The advantage of the mathematical rendition of 
the characteristics of emergence is that we have reduced three to one, except 
for possible additional requirements to ensure novel properties. Now the 
problem is to determine when computability fails in dynamical systems. That 
is when emergence begins.
Complexity and Organization
Complexity can mean complicated, that is, having many factors and many 
components, but it also is used in complexity theory to refer to organized 
complexity. Collier and Hooker (1999) note that if complexity in the 
complicated sense and organization are put on orthogonal axes, there are 
four quadrants of the following kinds:
  – Type I: Simple with low organization
  – Type II: Complex with low organization
  – Type III: Simple with high organization
  – Type IV: Complex with high organization
The first type would be typified by single-particle, conservative and 
decomposable (linearizable) multi-particle systems. The second would be 
exemplified by statistically-specified systems at or near equilibrium (e.g., 
gases and fluids). The third type would be sufficiently well-constrained 
but non-linearizable multi-particle systems; e.g., many machines and 
some electromagnetic systems. All three of these types of systems have 
analytic solutions for their dynamics, or convergent higher order additive 
approximations to these. This makes them tractable in the sense of 
predictability in the previous section. Type IV systems, however, are not 
tractable and can produce new organization through time. Known living 
systems fit into this category; so do weather systems, stream eddies and 
solar systems. Unlike systems of types I and III, whose organization, if any, 
is fully determined by their initial internal and boundary conditions, some 
type IV systems can produce new organization through time. And, unlike 
type II systems, whose organization, if any, is entirely imposed by initial 
and boundary conditions (think of a personal computer running a program), 28 John Collier
type IV systems contribute internally to maintaining their organization 
and, where it increases, to increasing it. I will explain how this works in 
more detail below; my main point here is to clearly distinguish complexly 
organized systems from merely complex systems. The latter can at best be 
weakly emergent; I will argue that type IV systems are typically emergent. 
They achieve this through dynamics that modify their own boundary 
conditions. This is self-organization.
I said earlier that two types of self-organization need to be distinguished. 
The first type is widespread and results from characteristics of components 
that allow them to form patterns as energy in the system is dissipated. 
Collier and Hooker (1999) call these self-reorganizing systems. They give 
the unambiguous example of a coin-sorting machine: 
Coins are often sorted by being placed in a sorting box, above a series 
of graduated meshes ordered by mesh size (biggest size on top) and 
chosen so that each mesh size is intermediate between the corresponding 
coin sizes. The sorter is randomly jiggled horizontally and the coins are 
automatically sorted by size as each eventually falls to its appropriate 
mesh, the meshes acting as passive filters. The coins have acquired 
a small increase in organization (von Foerster’s order-from-noise 
principle, with gravity the ordering principle) but the coin+sorter system 
has simply re-organized.
Note that in this device the extra energy of the coins must be dissipated, 
otherwise they would just continue to bounce around. All self-re-organization 
involves energy dissipation and leads to a local minimum of energy.   
Self-re-organization is often called self-assembly.
Consider hydrophobic-hydrophilic (ambipathic) molecules, such as 
fatty acids, that self-assemble to form a membrane through rearrangement 
of their hydrophobic and hydrophilic ends. In water, the hydrophobic ends 
tend to bunch together, whereas the hydrophilic ends tend to stick towards 
water. This leads to a double molecule layer that naturally forms into a nearly 
spherical vesicle. It has been proposed that such vesicles could allow amino 
acids and other molecules to reach a concentration inside that allows (with 
very large numbers of simultaneous “experiments”) eventually life-forming 
chemistry within the relatively protected regime inside the vesicle. Although 
the exact process of vesicle formation is not fully understood, dissipation is 
surely at work, or the molecules would just bounce back rather than bond. 
The vesicle forms a lower-energy state than other arrangements.29 Emergence in Dynamical Systems
In both these cases of self-re-organization, there is no new infor- 
mation created in the system, despite the appearance of what we deem 
order. If anything, information is lost as dissipation occurs. There is no 
compensating information produced. The order in the different sizes of the 
coins and the interaction potentials of water with fatty acids is implicit, 
and the dissipation process eliminates what is essentially noise, which is 
analogous to friction and the production of heat.
It used to be thought that the Moon always facing one side to the Earth 
was the result of another example of such an energy minimizing process 
in which there is a single final state determined by the properties of the 
components. Laplace was able to show that the 1-1 ratio of the Moon’s 
rotation to its revolution around the Earth was stable. If the Moon were to 
move slightly faster, the gravity of the Earth would pull it back and similarly 
if it were to go slightly slower: the lowest energy condition is the 1:1 ratio. 
This didn’t explain how the Moon got into the 1-1 ratio, however. George 
Darwin, one of Charles’ sons, was able to explain the approach to the ratio 
through the dissipation of tidal torque that is exerted if the ratio is either 
greater or less than 1-1. Laplace also explained the complex resonances of the 
four largest moons of Jupiter by the same dynamics. He answered objections 
that his theory did not fit the known observations by developing probability 
theory to show that it was more probable that his theory was right than that 
the measurements were right. He was right, and the addition of dissipation 
led to a theory that was accepted for a long time. The assumption was that 
dissipation leads to resonances that are at the lowest energy level, essentially 
the same mechanism as self-assembly.
It turns out these assumptions were wrong. This was discovered when 
it was discovered in the 1960s that Mercury turns on its axis three times for 
each two times that it goes around the Sun (Collier 2012b). Without going 
into great detail, the state space of the Mercury-Sun system has a number 
of stable basins (or attractors) that, while not the lowest energy situations, 
are lower energy than any place nearby in space, so that if the system gets 
close to one of these basins, dissipation is more likely to result in capture in 
that basin. The boundaries between the basins are almost certainly fractal, 
meaning that for any two points in one attractor basin there is a point 
between them in another basin. In fact, there are many basins in the system 
corresponding to ever higher resonances. The chances of a 1-1 capture are 
about ½. For a 3-2 ratio the odds are about ⅓. The rest of the probabilities 30 John Collier
are taken up by higher order resonances. What does this mean for Darwin’s 
explanation of the 1-1 ratio of the Moon’s orbit? Basically, it means that it 
is only a partial explanation: It explains why the 1-1 ratio is possible, and 
even likely, but it does not explain why the ratio is 1-1 rather than some 
higher resonance.9
In the planetary resonance cases, unlike in self-re-organization, there 
is arguably new information produced in the system as one or another of 
the possible resonances is selected. One might ask why this is not true in 
the self-assembly case. The answer is that the parts (coins or molecules) 
are interchangeable, so although there are many ways to get to the final 
result, they are all equivalent to each other.10 Noise dissipation creates 
a more ordered state, but the way it happens does not matter, since the noise 
(shaking in the case of the coin-sorting machine and random molecular 
translations, and vibrations in the case of the molecules) is random. In the 
planetary resonance case, however, minor differences that are effectively 
random are enough to put the system in one attractor rather than another. 
The result is not fully predictable (or retrodictable), even in principle. Unlike 
the unsolvable three-body case that can be predicted in principle for any 
finite time and for a specific margin of error, the result in this case is not 
predictable in finite time. The reason is that the dissipation allows the whole 
unsolvable process to be carried out in finite time, which never happens in 
systems without dissipation. 
So, are planetary resonances emergent? They certainly are unpredictable, 
at least in their details, and these details are significantly different. It might 
be argued, however, that they fail the condition of novelty. After all, we 
have no radically new properties: we start with orbits and rotations, and 
we end with orbits and rotations, albeit synchronized. I have argued that 
while such systems are not reducible, they can be explained, insofar as they 
can be explained, by reductive explanation using our understanding of the 
underlying dynamics (gravity and dissipation through tidal torques). If there 
9 Critics in his own time were right in saying that he had not given a full explanation 
of how the resonances came about. Such an explanation is in principle impossible.
10 But it is worth noting that the location of formed fatty acid vesicles might be 
intrinsically unpredictable because their nuclei of condensation might depend on chaotic 
fluctuations in the densities of their distribution in water.31 Emergence in Dynamical Systems
is a novel property, it is synchronization. This is certainly not radically novel 
like life or mind, but perhaps it is a beginning.
It is worth noting that despite their unpredictability, planetary 
resonances are diagnosable in the sense that once they are established, 
we can treat them as type I or III systems. I use “diagnosable” technically 
to mean that given the system laws – gravity and tidal dissipation, in this 
case—states of the system can be calculated to an arbitrarily high degree 
of accuracy. The resonant state is diagnosable, but its ancestral states are 
not fully diagnosable. In particular, planetary resonances do not appear to 
be complexly organized. In fact, they do not seem to be complex at all. 
Furthermore, there is no clear sense in which there is anything that we 
might call levels or wholes that emerge out of some underlying basis. So 
on a scale of emergence they are not weakly emergent, because they are not 
predictable, but they are not strongly emergent either, because they do not 
form wholes, and aggregativity is not relevant because they do not even seem 
to aggregate (or not to aggregate) anything. I think, however, that despite 
their simplicity, they can be worked into the same category as other, more 
paradigmatic type IV systems. 
There are fairly simple systems that do clearly have the properties of 
non-aggregativity and of forming wholes. Self-organizing systems, after 
Prigogine, are dissipative systems that use some of their dissipated energy 
to form order within themselves, where this order is at a larger scale than 
any order that existed before. Examples are eddies and cyclones, but classic 
examples are Bénard cells and slime molds. In all of these cases, small 
fluctuations are promoted to larger scale order at what is clearly a higher 
level, one that contains and constrains motions of the parts at a lower level. 
The higher level properties that form cannot be predicted knowing only 
the lower level properties. These lower level properties constrain what can 
happen at the higher level, but the higher level also constrains what happens 
at the lower level. Because of these higher-level constraints, possibilities 
become available that would not be available without them.
It is worthwhile looking in some detail at the Bénard cell system. This is 
a fluid in a container with a lid (to avoid surface effects) heated gently from 
below. As the heat differential from the bottom to the top is increased, there 
is a relatively sudden change from conduction of heat through the fluid to 
convection. It is possible to calculate the transition point from the properties 
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fluid and their pairwise (local) interactions with the equations of motion of 
the fluid in the convecting state. The two are equal at the transition point. 
The convecting state cannot be computed (in principle) from the equations 
of motion for the molecules (though interesting computational models can be 
made). We have to know that there is a convecting state in order to compare 
the two states and derive the transition point.11
There is no known way to derive a convecting state from the 
microscopic movements of molecules or local fluid dynamics, but we can 
give an intuitive explanation. It is very likely impossible due to (a) the 
impossibility of solving the equations of motion and (b) likely chaos at 
the molecular level. Nonetheless, we can get a pretty good understanding 
of what is going on. There are fluctuations in density in the system. These 
fluctuations are larger the higher the temperature. There is also viscosity 
that creates cohesion among the molecules of the fluid (or we may think of 
the fluid as intrinsically cohesive). As the temperature gradient is increased, 
there are larger regions of greater and lesser density. These regions are either 
buoyant or the opposite, respectively. The viscosity of the fluid holds these 
regions together against their tendency to disperse thermodynamically. As the 
regions grow larger, this tendency overcomes the dispersive tendency and 
the buoyant regions float upwards, while the denser regions sink. Because 
of the close constraints on the experimental conditions, regular cells form. 
The transition is thermodynamically stable, because it minimizes entropy 
production, basically following the path of least resistance. Viscosity, 
buoyancy and gravity make convection possible. Thermodynamic stability 
maintains it.
It is tempting to call Bénard cells emergent except for one thing, and 
that is that they are not unexpected. From our past knowledge of fluids we 
expect to see whorls and convection cells, so it is not surprising to find 
convection in Bénard cells. In fact, they were designed and studied just 
because we expected them to convect. Unlike planetary resonances, there 
is only one final state possible, given the design of the system. On the 
other hand, we are concerned with ontological emergence, not merely 
the surprisingly or unexpectedly new. Perhaps Bénard cells have the right 
dynamical properties to be emergent by sharing the required properties with 
other emergent systems. There is a clear sense in which Bénard cells are like 
11 For mathematical and intuitive details in more depth, see (Collier and Banerjee 2000).33 Emergence in Dynamical Systems
type IV systems: They are organized at a higher level, and their organization 
is deep in the sense that computing their surface structure from the dynamics 
of their components is at best highly non-trivial. It is worth noting at this 
point that my description of the Mercury-Sun resonance was over-simplified. 
In fact, it is a very weakly dissipative system. Gravitational influences from 
other planets cause perturbations from the perfect 3-2 resonance; however, 
tidal dissipation brings the resonance back (the perturbation times are so 
slow compared to the relaxation back to resonance, that Mercury basically 
maintains the resonance continuously, but the principle of continuous 
dissipation to maintain the resonant state holds). All resonances are subject 
to external perturbations.
Dynamical Emergence 
As I have said, self-reorganizing systems are not emergent in any but a weak 
sense, since they are reducible, and any novelty, such as it is, is predictable 
in principle (at least statistically). Self-organizing systems are different. Yet 
the steady state of convection in Bénard cells is diagnosable (the equations 
of motion for convection are solvable), as are the steady states of planetary 
resonances. The main differences are that Bénard cells have only one final 
state, whereas planetary resonances have multiple possible final states, and 
that Bénard cell convection cannot be computed from only the molecular 
dynamics, whereas resonant motion can. In one case, we have diachronic 
predictability, but not form the lower level; in the other case, exactly the 
opposite. On the other hand, in both cases we have truly novel properties 
appearing, albeit relatively simple. This leads to the question of what is 
the same across the two sorts of cases. Although neither case seems to be 
like paradigmatic cases of emergence, like life or mind, perhaps a common 
property is essential to emergent systems.
Hamiltonian systems as they are commonly understood have an 
overall force function that is holonomic; i.e., dependent only on the position 
coordinates and time if and only if the force is conservative, an example 
being particles in a gravitational field. It is possible that component forces 
are not conservative, but their combination must be. Energy being constant 
is also holonomic, as it depends only trivially on position coordinates and 
time. In general, if a system is holonomic, it can do no virtual work, because 34 John Collier
all virtual displacements are perpendicular to the forces of the constraints, 
so there is (or would be) no force on them. This is really just another way 
of saying that the Hamiltonian of holonomic systems depends only on 
(appropriately chosen) generalized coordinates and energy. A result of 
this, as I indicated in the section above on predictability, is that holonomic 
systems are predictable, at least by numerical methods.12 This is of central 
importance to the theory of dynamical emergence, as I will argue below.
The Bénard cell and resonance cases, being essentially dissipative in 
their dynamics, do not have constant system energy, since some leaves the 
system through dissipation. They are thus non-holonomic and cannot be 
dealt with by standard methods. This is true of both Bénard cells and the 
origin of the evolution of planetary resonances, simple as they are. For this 
reason, I include them with type IV systems, since they are more like them 
than any of the other three types of system. The characteristic of type IV 
systems, then, is not so much the amount of organization, but its irreducibly 
larger scale. 
An important characteristic of non-holonomic systems is that 
their equations of motion cannot be separated from their boundary 
conditions. Conrad and Matsuno (1990) make clear the consequences for 
dynamical systems:
Differential equations provide the major means of describing 
the dynamics of physical systems in both quantum and classical 
mechanics. The indubitable success of this scheme suggests, on the 
surface, that in principle it could be extended to a universal program 
covering all of nature. The problem is that the essence of a differential 
equation description is a separation of itself from the boundary 
conditions, which are regarded as arbitrary. 
Conrad and Matsuno draw conclusions for the whole universe (they 
claim the method breaks down, but it must be compatible with “no boundary 
conditions” constraints on cosmological theories). More significant for 
present purposes is the breakdown of the separation of differential equations 
and boundary conditions in non-integrable systems, exactly the ones that 
are non-holonomic (in which constraints like boundary conditions cannot 
12 The argument is given in a more technical form in (Collier 2008a). See also Hooker 
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be separated from their dynamics). In these systems, computation from 
partwise interactions fails, and the system is in a sense holistic. In any case, 
its dynamics cannot be reduced to the dynamics and partwise relations. This 
is one of the conditions for emergence. Non-integrability also implies some 
sort of unpredictability as I have defined it. Note that inseparability applies in 
both the Bénard cell and planetary resonance cases. The origin of the cells in 
the first case cannot be understood in terms of boundary conditions (gravity, 
heat differential) alone; the formation of the cells creates new boundary 
conditions on the cells (a macro constraint) that cannot be computed from 
relations of the parts (molecules) alone. In the planetary resonance case, 
the formation of the resonance changes the boundary conditions by adding 
a new constraint (resonance). This is the common feature.
It is generally recognized that standard Hamiltonian systems are 
mechanical (mechanistic). This idea is summed up by their holonomic 
character, in an engineer’s sense that all their constraints can be expressed 
algebraically and are basically geometric. Non-holonomic systems, on the 
other hand, must have a constraint that is expressed as a rate of change, 
so their form cannot be integrated into an algebraic form and they cannot 
be understood geometrically. Some examples of non-holonomic systems 
are a rolling wheel (friction matters) or whirlwinds. A wheel can undergo 
a sudden change of state when it goes into a skid; a whirlwind dies if it 
loses its sustaining energy differential. These indicate two central features 
of emergent systems: relatively sudden changes of the state space, and 
the necessity of dissipation in understanding the dynamics. These two 
characteristics also hold of the examples of planetary resonance (resonance 
arises rapidly in astronomical time) and Bénard cells.
Some systems are non-Hamiltonian, but are nearly Hamiltonian. 
We can deal with such systems with approximations. This is a common 
method, using a version of perturbation theory. Other non-Hamiltonian 
systems step rapidly from one state to another (rapidity is relative here). The 
dynamics of these systems can be analyzed by comparing the micro- and 
known macro-mechanics, along with knowledge of the transition, and by 
treating the transformation as a step function. This is how Bénard cells were 
in fact analyzed. However, there is a large range of systems that are not close 
to step functions or close to smooth Hamiltonian systems. I conjecture that 
this sort of radically non-Hamiltonian behavior underlies all emergence. 
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1.  The system must be non-holonomic, implying that the system is 
non-integrable (this ensures non-reducibility).
2.  The system is energetically (and/or informationally) open (boundary 
conditions are dynamic).
3.  The system has multiple attractors (the Bénard cell has two).
4.  The characteristic rate of at least one property of the system is of 
the same order as the rate of the non-holonomic constraint (radically 
non-Hamiltonian).
5.  If at least one of the properties is an essential property of the system, 
the system is essentially non-reducible; it is thus an emergent 
system.
I don’t claim that these conditions are independent; in fact I think they 
are not. I choose them because they are relatively easy to argue for in 
specific dynamical cases, and from that to emergence. I do claim, however, 
that the conditions are necessary and sufficient dynamical conditions for 
emergence. All are required for the emergence of systems, and all but the 
last for emergence of properties. If any condition above is violated (perhaps 
implying the violation of others), there is no emergence. To show necessity 
is fairly trivial. If condition 1 is violated, the system is at least numerically 
computable and hence predictable. If condition 2 is violated, the boundary 
conditions are fixed rather than dynamic, so they are holonomic. If condition 
3 is violated, we can predict a single attractor, as we can for classic complex 
systems like the Lorenz attractor. If condition 4 is violated, then the 
system can be treated as approximately Hamiltonian, and it is predictable. 
If condition 5 is violated, there is no emergent property, perhaps just a chaotic 
system. Since none of these conditions are specific to the examples I have 
given, they apply to all cases. Together, I claim, the conditions are sufficient. 
So I have given necessary and sufficient (but probably not independent) 
dynamical conditions for non-reducibility and unpredictability.
There might be worries at this point. Typical life and mind have been 
taken to be emergent. These seem to be novel in a way that my examples are 
not. Am I missing important properties of emergence? Living systems are 
functional in a way that nonliving systems are not. Mind has the additional 
property of consciousness. Although I have argued that Bénard cells and 
planetary resonance have novel properties (convection and resonance, 
respectively), perhaps these are not novel enough. They certainly do not 
seem to be on the same scale. Novelty is a tricky issue with dynamical 37 Emergence in Dynamical Systems
emergence, since all of the causes are driven in some sense at the lower level. 
Given that conditions 1-5 are satisfied, the new property is not a sum of the 
properties of the components, either. There is something genuinely novel. 
In my own work, I have focused on cases in which the emergent entity is 
a system, rather than a system property, and I have called the fusion of the 
dynamical unity property of the system cohesion (Collier and Muller 1998; 
Collier and Hooker 1999). Both Bénard cells and resonances require cohesion 
for their central emergent property. Novelty, rather than being hard to get, 
is rather easy to achieve, and many systems have emergent properties that 
define them dynamically. This might be reflected in Broad’s view that water 
is emergent from its components (whether or not he was right about this). 
The centrality of work
One of the things that is typical of living systems is that they do work on 
themselves in order to maintain themselves. The major currency for the 
cell, and consequently for known living systems, is ATP. It allows otherwise 
thermodynamically impossible chemical processes to occur (typically 
producing more organized states). Organization in living systems ensures 
that these processes contribute to the maintenance and growth of the system. 
Basically, an organism does work on itself in order to maintain the conditions 
for its continued existence. It does this by producing the boundary conditions 
required. This is a typical emergent process in which the dynamics of the 
system interact in both ways with the boundary conditions. I have argued 
elsewhere (Collier 2004; 2011) that the organization that contributes to 
the continued existence of the organism, which I call autonomy, is the 
dynamical identity of the organism. Anything that contributes to autonomy 
is biologically functional. This approach guarantees the “forward-looking” 
character of function by incorporating anticipation (Collier 2008b). A full 
explanation would be too long, but we can ask the question of whether 
functionality is emergent. Given the non-equilibrium and dissipative quality 
of life (required for it to do work on itself), life is surely emergent in my sense. 
Unfortunately, I do not know at this point if functionality itself is emergent 
in some further sense. I suspect so, since I see it to be a necessary property 
of autonomy, which emerges from the work done to maintain organization. 
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then its dynamics are fully diagnosable as outlined above. But if autonomy 
is dynamic, with new nodes forming and old ones disappearing, then it is 
a good candidate for emergence. I think the evidence favours the latter, but 
it would take me to far afield to recite all the evidence.
The issue of consciousness is much more difficult, especially the 
notorious “hard problem” (Chalmers 1996). Terrence Deacon (2011), in 
a masterful work, makes some headway on this problem, but does not claim to 
have solved it. Obviously the brain itself is supported by dissipative processes 
and uses a very large percentage of the body’s energy consumption by weight. 
Presumably there is a lot of work done to maintain the nervous system, and 
this is especially important for maintaining thought. This does not show, 
however, that thought requires dissipation, let alone consciousness. If thought 
is strictly computational, as has been widely held,13 then it is reducible to its 
underlying processes (like all computation). Deacon argues that this leaves 
open questions about meaning and intention that are either presupposed, 
explaining nothing, or dismissed, explaining nothing. I will have to leave 
the issue here as far as analysis goes, but I do have a few observations.
First, as with function, a steady state model of thought implies 
reducibility (of thought to its components), ruling out emergence. This 
position is implied by Fodor’s Language of Thought Hypothesis (Fodor 
1975), as all the basic nodes are innate. As with function, the emergence 
in thought requires the formation and/or elimination of nodes. This is an 
empirical matter for which there is currently only ambiguous evidence. I have 
argued (Collier 2001) that if thought is not in equilibrium with its external 
conditions, an unexpected stimulus can cause it to reorganize around the 
new stimulus, accommodating it and thereafter being prepared for it to some 
degree. This would represent emergence in thought, though it must be said 
that the dynamical closure involves both the thinker and the environment, 
and there is a clear sense in which that whole is the locus of the emergence. 
Further work requires empirical studies.
13 The arguable view goes back to the Cartesians, like de La Mettrie, but re-emerged in 
the 20th Century with the invention of digital computers. It held sway for some time, but 
wilted under attacks concerning its capacity to explain meaning, something that Deacon 
has taken up. S. Edelman (2008) has revived the approach.39 Emergence in Dynamical Systems
Conclusions
Emergence has two forms, weak and strong. Although the weak version 
is interesting, it is the strong one that requires revision of many current 
views of the nature of things. The central properties of strong emergence, 
irreducibility, unpredictability, holism and novelty stem from the same source 
in computability. This source can be explained in dynamical terms. Strong 
emergence turns out not to be rare, but fairly common from physics on up, 
but clear examples even from biological function require more work, and 
even more so for psychological, mental and social sciences.
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